




The Roosevelt Image on Trial:  





On 10 April 1937, the Gridiron Club, the exclusive association of Washington DC press 
bureau chiefs, held its annual spring dinner at the Willard Hotel.  There could be only one 
issue to provide the central theme for the evening’s topical entertainment – the controversy 
surrounding President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s proposal to reorganize the Supreme Court by 
adding a new justice for every sitting judge over the age of 70.  The so-called ‘court-packing’ 
plan would have increased the membership of this august body from its current complement 
of nine to fifteen.  Attending the prestigious Gridiron dinner as guests were FDR, his son 
James, Vice President John Nance Garner, other Cabinet officials, members of Congress, and 
prominent leaders of business and labour.   Three Supreme Court judges were also present – 
Associate Justices James Clark McReynolds and Harlan Stone and Chief Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes, who was 75 the next day and received a rendition of ‘Happy Birthday to You’ 
from Gridiron members.  
FDR attended the Gridiron dinners throughout his presidency without ever really 
enjoying them.  On this occasion he made an uncontroversial speech that contained only one 
indirect reference to the age of retirement and a mild joke at the expense of his vice president 
– a critic of the Court proposal.1  In contrast, the issue dominated the various satirical 
sketches performed by Gridiron members that evening.  One skit, located in ‘old Castile,’ 
portrayed FDR as ‘Don Quixote’ interacting with his henchman, ‘Sancho Panza Garner’. 
‘Seest thou not yon castle of finance?’ Don Quixote remarks to his sidekick.  ‘There lies 
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some poor forgotten wight under dire oppression to whose relief I am brought hither.’ 
‘Them’s windmills, Boss,’ answers Panza. ‘They grind the corn. They’re useful.’  
In another skit, located in what was described as the ‘modest suburban home of a 
prince of privilege,’ a group of ‘economic royalists’ gathered by a fireside to hear FDR on the 
radio. A female listener was immediately won over. ‘From now on I’m a New Dealer,’ she 
declared. ‘You couldn’t understand a word he said,’ protested one of the others. ‘Of course 
not,’ she replied. ‘But what difference does it make? Oh, that lovely voice!’ This exchange 
was accompanied by a song that extolled the virtues of the president’s radio performances.  
          We hear a voice which softly rings 
                                                     The Voice on the Radio. 
                                                      It promises so many things 
                                                      The Voice on the Radio. 
                                                      In dreams we drift thru a twilight haze 
                                                      Under the spell of a magic phrase 
                                                      And visions fair of Happy Days 
                                                      The Voice on the Radio.  
The final act of the evening saw the fifteen members of the new Supreme Court walk 
on to the stage to the ‘March of the Toys,’ played by the Marine Band Orchestra. ‘This court 
is far too crowded,’ said one justice. ‘What do you expect in a packed court – a private room 
and bath?’ replied another. When the Chief Justice asked for nominees to join the Supreme 
Court, anyone contributing more than $1,000 to the 1936 Democratic campaign could put his 
own name forward, while smaller donors had to settle for the Circuit Courts of Appeal. A 
messenger from the president then arrived with the instruction to hurry up declaring the new 
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laws constitutional as it had already taken two hours to get them through Congress.  When 
the Chief Justice pointed out that he did not know what was in them, he was told not to worry 
as nor did Congress. To which he replied, implicitly drawing a contrast between the 
obedience FDR expected of today’s judiciary and the judicial giants who had established the 
independence of the third branch of national government in the early republic: ‘Gentlemen of 
the court, get out your rubber stamps! And, above all, keep your minds off John Marshall!’2 
The fact that the 1937 Gridiron dinner was so dominated by the Supreme Court battle 
underlined its significance at the start of FDR’s second term and the integral role of the media 
in the controversy. The image its satirical sketches conveyed of Roosevelt was that of a 
patrician reformer concerned to stand up for the needs of the ‘forgotten man’ and his family 
against the opposition of the ‘economic royalists,’ namely the anti-New Deal business elite.  
They additionally portrayed him as a leader with almost mystical powers of persuasion, 
especially via the medium of radio. This was the common image of FDR in the wake of his 
landslide re-election as president in November 1936. It also accords with the scholarly 
perception of him as a consummate politician and leader.  Historian William Leuchtenburg 
referred to Roosevelt as ‘the Great Campaigner,’ while political scientist Richard Neustadt 
considered him the greatest exponent of the ‘power to persuade,’ the essential instrument in a 
president’s political armoury.3 
As the Gridiron skits demonstrated, the Supreme Court controversy raised concerns 
about FDR’s methods and motives in advocating such a far-reaching change in the judicial 
branch of government without seeking a constitutional amendment. It also called into 
question his ability to persuade the American public, notably through his mastery of radio 
broadcasting, that he was pursuing the right course for the nation rather than just for himself. 
Thus, in a very real sense, the Roosevelt image as a great reformer and a ‘Great Campaigner’ 
was on trial during the Supreme Court battle of 1937.  In exploring this aspect of the 
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controversy, this essay begins by considering the nature and origins of FDR’s image as a 
New Dealer and political communicator in his first term. It then examines the Supreme Court 
battle and the media’s role in it, before assessing whether the outcome dented perceptions of 
FDR as the embodiment of the great reformer and great communicator. Finally, by way of 
conclusion, the essay discusses the resilience of the ‘Roosevelt image’ that continues to 
undergird his twenty-first century reputation as a great president. 4 
The Roosevelt Image  
Presidential image, is of course, a multi-faceted concept and, like beauty, it lies largely in the 
eye of the beholder. It is a construct of, among other things, public opinion, the political elite, 
the academic community and the cultural media.  There is also a distinction to be made 
between presidential image as perceived by domestic and foreign audiences. In addition, it is 
important to note that although FDR’s electoral success was second to none, he was both a 
unifier and a divider during the Great Depression years.  He was a hero to the common 
people who made up the bulk of his voter support; he was a traitor to his class insofar as 
many in the upper stratum of society were concerned; and he was the propagator of alien 
doctrines to his conservative political opponents, both Republican and Democrat, as the 
architect of big-government liberalism that supplanted the traditional ascendancy of 
individualism and states’ rights in American political culture. 
Until the New Deal transformed it, the Democratic party had supported Jeffersonian 
ideals of small government and predominantly represented the interests of the white South in 
national politics. By 1936, FDR’s socio-economic programmes had mobilized the support of 
a new urban voter coalition outside Dixie that would give his party a lock on the presidency 
until the end of the 1960s.  Its constituent elements included Northern city dwellers, ethnics, 
labour union members, African Americans, women and the unemployed, all of whom 
benefited from his expansion of federal authority and responsibility.   By contrast, more 
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conservative Democrats, mainly but not exclusively based in the South, regarded the New 
Deal as a threat to constitutional principles of limited national government and the 
sovereignty of the states.5 
Historians generally have a positive image of FDR and rank him alongside George 
Washington and Abraham Lincoln as one of America’s three greatest presidents. For James 
McGregor Burns, his first major biographer and arguably the best, ‘Roosevelt was one of the 
master politicians of his time, certainly the most successful vote getter. His political artistry 
grew out of long experience with the stuff of American politics: men’s ambitions, fears, and 
loyalties operating through conventions, primaries, elections, offices, constitutions, opinion 
agencies.’  Referencing Machiavelli’s view that a leader needs to show boldness and cunning 
at different times, he entitled the first volume of his FDR biography, The Lion and the Fox. 
More recently, Robert Dallek has written: ‘Roosevelt, like his cousin Theodore, was an 
instinctively brilliant politician,’ who ‘principally relied on his feel for the public mood to 
guide him in leading the country’. Nor is this view of FDR confined to US historians – a poll 
of British academics in 2011 rated him America’s greatest president, ahead of both 
Washington and Lincoln.6 
When examining the nature of FDR’s political image, and especially the role of the 
media in its construction, it is important to note that it originated at a time when radio and 
newsreels were in their infancy. Key elements of FDR’s image, regarding his personal 
qualities, his words and his actions, had already been formed before he became president, but 
it was only after he entered the White House that they reached full maturity with the help of 
new media. A significant early influence was the family name that benefitted from 
association with the dynamism and progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt, FDR’s distant 
cousin. Woodrow Wilson was not oblivious to the advantages of including a Democratic 
Roosevelt in his administration when appointing the young FDR Assistant Secretary of the 
6 
 
Navy – a post occupied by his illustrious relative in the Spanish-American War of 1898.  
Franklin Roosevelt served in this capacity during the Great War and, like ‘Uncle Teddy,’ he 
emerged from his wartime experience with his reputation enhanced, if not quite to the same 
extent.7 
Like his eminent forbear, FDR climbed another rung on the political ladder with his 
nomination as vice president in 1920, an elevation reflecting Democratic hopes that his 
illustrious name would attract support from progressive Republican voters. The main medium 
for the formation of political image at this time remained the press but newsreels were 
gaining in importance – and FDR became a star in both during the 1920 campaign. Following 
his vice-presidential nomination, the New York Times gave Roosevelt a big spread on its front 
page and newsreel footage showed him as a tall, handsome figure, with a winning smile and 
an adoring family – Eleanor and their five children, plus doting mother Sara. Notwithstanding 
the landslide Republican victory, the 38-year old FDR’s energetic campaigning provided a 
beacon of hope for Democratic revival and marked him out as a future presidential 
contender.8   
Roosevelt’s protracted convalescence after contracting polio in 1921 was a great 
personal setback but did not kill his political ambition. With the assistance of Eleanor 
Roosevelt and Louis Howe, his faithful adviser, he was able to enhance his public image at a 
time when the Democratic party was badly divided over Prohibition, the Ku Klux Klan and 
immigration. His ‘Happy Warrior’ speech on behalf of Al Smith’s bid for the Democratic 
presidential nomination at the 1924 national convention in New York City won widespread 
praise from pundits and politicos both for the quality of its delivery and the bravery he 
showed in making his way to the podium on crutches for his return to the political spotlight.  
Though failing to gain the nomination in 1924, Smith won it four years later with the help of 
another nominating address by FDR at the national convention in Houston.  On this occasion, 
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Roosevelt got to the podium not on crutches but supported by the strong right arm of his son 
James, who performed a similar role on many subsequent occasions when FDR was 
Governor of New York and later President.9 
Smith in turn persuaded a reluctant Roosevelt to run for governor of New York to 
boost his own chances of winning the Empire State in his presidential race against Herbert 
Hoover.  Sensing that the Republican tide was too strong, FDR preferred to bide his time to 
run for president in 1936, but he was fearful of becoming a pariah in his own party if he 
ignored its presidential candidate’s call to arms. Smith predictably went down to defeat, even 
losing his home state of New York, but Roosevelt won the gubernatorial race with a vigorous 
campaign that bucked the nationwide GOP trend. Like Theodore Roosevelt before him, FDR 
used the New York governorship to establish a national reputation, proving himself a creative 
and dynamic state leader in facing the growing challenge of the Great Depression in the early 
1930s. This record was instrumental in propelling him to the Democratic nomination for 
president in July 1932. Signifying his determination not to be bound by orthodoxy if he won 
office, he broke precedent by flying to Chicago, where the Democratic national convention 
was in session, to accept the nomination in person.  Addressing the delegates, he said: ‘Let it 
be symbolic that in so doing I broke traditions. Let it be from now on the task of our Party to 
break foolish traditions.’ Pledging ‘a new deal for the American people,’ he mounted an 
energetic campaign that promised strong action against the economic crisis if elected 
president without being specific about what he intended to do.  The unpopular incumbent 
Herbert Hoover proved no match for the dynamic challenger – lacking a record to defend, his 
efforts to portray his opponent as an untried second-rater got nowhere, as did his later 
attempts to depict him as a dangerous radical.10 
The unobtrusive physical support from sons James and Elliot and others (notably 
military aide Edwin ‘Pa’ Watson), during Roosevelt’s public appearances as presidential 
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candidate and then president was an important aspect of what one historian has called ‘FDR’s 
splendid deception.’ With the collusion of the media (reinforced by Press Secretary Stephen 
Early’s strict rules about how FDR was to be photographed and filmed), he succeeded in 
hiding the true extent of his disability from the American public and, indeed, the world. In the 
1932 campaign, too, Roosevelt and his aides misleadingly framed his condition as temporary 
and likely to continue improving, a narrative that paralleled the promise of economic 
recovery he offered the nation.  In fact, FDR remained wheelchair-bound for the rest of his 
life and needed assistance to undertake almost any activity that would have involved use of 
his legs.  Had the full scale of his paralysis been known to the public, he would likely never 
have made it to the White House.  Even if he had won election as president, it is almost 
inconceivable that he could have developed and sustained the image of being a strong leader 
if he was widely perceived as incapable of unassisted mobility in the wake of his polio 
attack.11 
The ‘Great Campaigner’ 
From the moment he took office with the nation’s financial system on the verge of meltdown 
Roosevelt exuded an image of confidence in his ability to put things right.  His Inaugural 
Address on 4 March 1933, in which he famously declared that Americans had ‘nothing to 
fear but fear itself,’ set the tone for bold and optimistic leadership that contrasted markedly 
with Hoover’s hesitation and pessimism in the face of the crisis.  On 6 March he declared a 
‘bank holiday’ that temporarily closed financial institutions to prevent further runs;  on 9 
March he secured and signed legislation from Congress giving his administration authority to 
take steps to restore confidence in the banks; and on 12 March he have his first Fireside Chat 
explaining his intentions and asking people to keep their money in the reopened banks, a 
request that elicited an overwhelmingly positive response.12  
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Roosevelt’s Republican predecessors, Calvin Coolidge and Hoover, had used radio as 
a medium of communication, but neither came close to matching him as a speaker over the 
airwaves. The first Fireside Chat was broadcast on a Sunday evening, a day and time when he 
would be heard by the largest audience of the week. FDR’s calm and measured explanation 
of the banking crisis and the steps he would take to resolve it did much to restore popular 
confidence in the nation’s financial system. Of equal significance, the radio address 
established his presidential image as a friend or neighbour who joined ordinary people in 
their homes to talk about the   problems of the times. [see image below of FDR’s first 
Fireside Chat]  In the days that followed, the White House received a huge volume of mail in 
response to the talk, setting a pattern for subsequent Fireside Chats and establishing a unique 
dialogue between president and people. Thanks to FDR’s ‘conspicuous courage, 
cheerfulness, energy, and resource,’ Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador reported, 
‘…. the starved loyalties and repressed hero-worship of the country have found in him an 





However, some of the measures adopted by Congress during the early months of the 
New Deal met with more criticism, especially the National Industrial Recovery Act, the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act and the devaluation of the dollar. FDR delivered two more 
Fireside Chats – on 7 May and 24 July – to explain and defend his policies directly to the 
American people, referring in the latter to ‘the hundred days which had been devoted to the 
starting of the wheels of the New Deal.’ The ‘Bombshell message’ that Roosevelt sent to the 
World Economic Conference in London on 3 July rounded off this intense period of activism. 
Rebuking the delegates for their continued adherence to the ‘old fetishes of so-called 
international bankers,’ FDR told them not to focus on currency stabilisation but to discuss 
trade policy and other economic issues. Now increasingly concerned at the direction of the 
New Deal, Sir Ronald Lindsay commented of the president whom he had so greatly praised 
just a short time ago: ‘Mr Roosevelt is, in these complex matters, an almost complete amateur 
and an opportunist, in a country where both types tend to predominate.’14 
While Roosevelt’s image abroad was now dented, at home public opinion and the 
press remained largely favourable to him. The ‘Bombshell message’ was regarded in the US 
as a financial declaration of independence from Europe. Frank Knox, a leading Republican 
and the owner of the influential Chicago Daily News, who had served under TR in the 
‘Rough Riders’ during the Spanish American War, welcomed what he called its dose of 
‘Rooseveltian realism, which does not hesitate to call a spade a spade’. Henry Stimson, 
another Republican admirer of Theodore Roosevelt, arriving in Britain on 12 July on 
vacation, also approved of Roosevelt’s message although not the language that had been 
employed.  He felt that FDR’s character was impulsive and similar in this respect to that of 
Theodore Roosevelt – in whose administration he had served prior to joining the Taft 
Administration as Secretary of War.15 
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The ‘Hundred Days’ and the ‘Bombshell message’ consolidated FDR’s initial image 
as a strong leader in the TR mould who was putting the US first. In fact, he had gone beyond 
TR in his advocacy on behalf of ‘the forgotten man,’ a stance that Al Smith condemned as a 
call to ‘class warfare.’ Smith subsequently joined the Liberty League, an organization of 
conservative businessmen and politicians formed to defend ‘American values’ against the 
perceived radicalism of the New Deal. In response to their accusations that he was acting like 
a dictator, Roosevelt insisted that he was defending American democracy by safeguarding 
ordinary people from the economic ravages of the Great Depression. The increased 
congressional majorities won by the Democrats in the 1934 midterm elections suggested that 
FDR was winning the argument against his conservative critics, but he now faced grassroots 
anger that the New Deal had not gone far enough to help the common people.  Senator Huey 
Long of Louisiana, Father Charles Coughlin, the so-called ‘radio priest,’ and Francis 
Townsend, the California physician who advocated old-age pensions, became the champions 
of this populist protest.  Long posed the greatest danger to FDR’s re-election because he 
could draw many votes away from the president by running as a third-party candidate, but his 
assassination in September 1935 eliminated that threat.  Even so, Roosevelt was aware that 
Coughlin and Townsend could still mobilize popular opposition if the New Deal failed to 
deliver reforms that benefited the mass of people.16 
FDR’s relationship with the media was obviously an important ingredient in his 
electoral success. He felt that most newspaper owners, exemplified by Chicago Tribune 
publisher Robert ‘Colonel’ McCormick, were largely pro-business GOP supporters. By 
contrast, with the help of a very efficient press office headed by Steve Early, Roosevelt 
developed a good relationship with most journalists.  Reporters valued FDR’s bi-weekly 
press conferences as a constant source of news, appreciated not having to submit written 
questions in advance as required by his Republican predecessors, and enjoyed interacting 
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with a president so willing to give them copy.  By and large newspaper correspondents wrote 
favourable articles about FDR throughout his first term, but editorial opinion grew more 
critical as the New Deal became more interventionist on socio-economic issues in 1935. The 
Revenue Act established a ‘wealth tax,’ the Social Security Act introduced federal old age 
pensions and unemployment insurance, and the National Labor Relations Act greatly 
strengthened trade union rights. Breaking with Roosevelt, whom he had initially supported, 
media mogul William Randolph Hearst made his newspaper chain a powerful voice of 
opposition to the New Deal.17  
Faced with the hostility of newspaper owners, FDR valued the radio and newsreels as 
ways of communicating his message to the public. With some 60 percent of households 
owning a radio in 1932, the market continued to grow in defiance of economic conditions – 
there were estimated sales of 8 million new sets in 1936 and 9 million in 1937. In 1934 the 
licensing of radio stations became the responsibility of the newly-established Federal 
Communications Commission.  This independent regulatory agency consisted of five 
commissioners, nominated by the President and confirmed by Senate to serve for five years, 
and a chair designated by the President. Although no more than three commissioners could be 
chosen from the same political party, authority to appoint them became an important 
presidential power, one that FDR was not shy of using.  Through Steve Early, the Roosevelt 
White House paid close attention to radio station audience sizes and their reporting of the 
president when broadcasters sought licence renewal.18  
Newsreels became a significant medium of political communication that featured in 
virtually every movie-house programme as the silent-film era gave way to the ‘talkies.’  Their 
popularity led to the opening of all-newsreel theatres, beginning with the Embassy Theater in 
New York in November 1929.  Seeing a market for pictorial depiction of current affairs, a 
handful of newsreel chains opened houses in other cities as the 1930s progressed.  According 
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to W. French Githens, managing editor of Pathé News and founder of Newsreel Theaters Inc, 
‘We soon discovered that in Franklin Delano Roosevelt we had the greatest single attraction. 
Announcement of his fireside chats, which were always filmed, brought hundreds of patrons 
to the theater. Anti-New Dealers came to hiss. The vigorous years of the New Deal under 
FDR and the rise of Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek aroused great interest in 
newsreels.’19  
The ’vigorous years of the New Deal’ saw an unprecedented amount of legislation 
that empowered federal involvement in new areas of economic regulation, social welfare 
provision, and protection of labour rights.  In Roosevelt’s first term, the principal opposition 
to these innovations came not from the Republican party or conservative Democrats but from 
the Supreme Court.  Four of the nine justices on the Court – Pierce Butler, James Clark 
McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter – became known to the press as 
the ‘four horsemen’ for their steadfast opposition to key features of the early New Deal as an 
unconstitutional expansion of federal authority. When joined by Associate Justice Owen 
Roberts and, on occasions, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes in the 1935 term, this 
conservative bloc invalidated some key  Roosveltian measures, notably the National 
Industrial Relations Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Railroad Act and the Coal 
Mining Act.  FDR feared that subsequent New Deal reforms such as the Social Security Act 
and the National Labour Relations Act would be invalidated sooner or later by the 
conservatives on the Court unless they could be curbed during his second term.20 
In the meantime, the 1936 presidential election turned into a referendum on 
Roosevelt’s leadership and his reforms.  The Republican platform began with the words: 
‘America is in peril.’ Charging that ‘the New Deal Administration has dishonoured American 
traditions,’ it urged ‘all Americans, irrespective of party, to join us in defense of American 
institutions.’ FDR responded with a stirring speech accepting his party’s presidential 
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nomination at its national convention in Philadelphia.  In the city where the Continental 
Congress had adopted the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the president reminded his 
audience that the Founding Fathers had ended political tyranny, but he went on to warn that 
the rise of modern industry had brought with it a new tyranny of ‘economic royalists,’ whose 
‘new dynasties’ threatened democracy by creating huge inequalities of wealth. ‘Here in 
America,’ he declared, ‘we are waging a great and successful war. It is not alone a war 
against want and destitution and economic demoralization. It is more than that; it is a war for 
the survival of democracy. We are fighting to save a great and precious form of government 
for ourselves and for the world’. 21 
The Supreme Court battle of 1937  
FDR believed that there was only one issue in the 1936 presidential election – himself. To the 
extent that it was a contest between two contrasting images of Roosevelt, the outcome was a 
clear victory for FDR as reformer and ‘Great Campaigner’ over FDR as threat to 
constitutional democracy. He won a huge personal victory, gaining 46 out of 48 states (all 
except Maine and Vermont), 523 electoral votes against 8 for his Republican opponent, 
Governor Alf Landon of Kansas, and almost 61 percent of the popular vote. Thanks to his 
coattails, the Democrats increased their already large majorities in both houses of Congress. 
To some pundits, the result put the continued existence of the Republican party in doubt.  The 
Union party that Father Coughlin and Francis Townsend had organized to promote William 
Lemke’s independent presidential candidacy had proved a damp squib.  After its rout, the 
‘radio priest,’ whose anti-Roosevelt tirades had reached a wide audience, announced that he 
was going off the air.22 
FDR barely mentioned the Supreme Court  during the campaign, but his smashing 
electoral victory emboldened him to propose a radical plan for its reorganization.  In his 
inaugural address on 20 January 1937, he acknowledged that the state of the nation was much 
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improved in comparison to its condition four years earlier, but much remained to be done to 
fulfil ‘our progressive purpose.’  Encapsulating the New Deal’s unfinished business in a 
short, simple, but striking sentence, Roosevelt declared, ‘I see one-third of a nation ill-
housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.’ Anxious that the Supreme Court might invalidate his 
initiatives to help those in most need, he was in a great hurry to reform it without going 
through the drawn-out process of constitutional amendment. Based on the advice of 
Attorney-General Homer Cummings, the president intended to enlarge the Court by 
appointing up to six new justices.  The patently devious rationale for such a dramatic change 
entailed dressing it up as part of a broader Judiciary Bill based on the need for ‘new blood’ in 
view of the advanced age of some current justices. FDR kept the plan a closely guarded 
secret that he did not share with Democratic National Committee chair James Farley and 
party leaders in Congress until the eve of making it public at his press conference on 5 
February 1937.23  
  Republicans predictably opposed what soon became known as FDR’s ‘court-packing’ 
plan, seeing it as vindication of their 1936 campaign warnings about the New Deal’s threat to 
American institutions. Frank Knox, the GOP’s vice-presidential candidate who had compared 
FDR to TR in 1933, now saw nothing in common between them apart from their family 
name.  Henry Stimson, whom TR had appointed a US attorney, was also critical of his 
cousin’s disrespect for the Constitution in the pages of his diary.  Republican traditionalists 
like Herbert Hoover were also up in arms at the threat to the separation of the powers.24  For 
the most part, however, Republicans left it to the Democrats to criticise the plan, which many 
of them proceeded to do – in the press and on the radio.  
Opposition in the Senate from conservative Democrats like Harry Byrd of Virginia 
and Josiah Bailey of North Carolina was to be expected, but some prominent liberals joined 
in the attack. Burton Wheeler of Montana, hitherto a strong New Dealer, played a leading 
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role in masterminding the defeat of the Judiciary Bill.  In addition to putting forward an 
alternative proposal for popular review of Supreme Court decisions, first suggested by 
Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, he obtained a private letter from Chief Justice Hughes 
containing reassurances that the nine justices were up to date with their docket and did not 
require additional appointments to keep on top of their work.25 
In also coming out against the court-packing plan, several eminent journalists 
portrayed FDR as posing a threat to America’s constitutional democracy.  Most damningly, 
Walter Lippmann noted the similarities between his proposed judicial reform and the actions 
of dictators in Europe.  In his view, FDR was to all intents and purposes acting on the 
assumption that democracy could not function in America unless power was centralized in 
his hands, but that development would only destroy what it was intended to save.26  Even 
normally supportive newspapers like the New York Times accused Roosevelt of engaging in 
‘political sharp practice’ by hiding a major constitutional change ‘under the name of judicial 
reform.’  This was a mild rebuke in comparison with editorials elsewhere that depicted 
Roosevelt as a tyrant in the making. ‘Nothing can disguise the naked sword that has been 
drawn,’ opined the Brooklyn Eagle.  ‘Already possessing far more power than any peace-time 
President has ever held, with an unprecedented control over both Houses of Congress, he has 
asked for power over the judiciary. This is too much power for any man to hold in a country 
that still calls itself a democracy.’ Disdaining FDR’s failure to mention his plans during the 
recent election campaign, the Baltimore Sun accused him of being ‘disingenuous with the 
people.’27 
Losing the battle  
This widespread attack on the Court plan put FDR on the defensive. He initially hoped that 
speeches and interviews from loyalists like Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes and 
pressure on Democratic members of Congress from New Deal groups with an interest in   
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Court reform, notably labour unions, would suffice.  Before long, however, it was clear that 
he would have to make an open appeal for support. With the fox giving way to the lion, FDR 
launched a double-pronged attack in early March – addressed first to his party and then to the 
public in a Fireside Chat. At a Victory Dinner at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington DC, on 4 
March, he called on Democrats to be bold. Mindful of the rise of dictators in Europe and of 
home-grown demagogues in the mould of Huey Long, he warned: ‘If we do not have the 
courage to lead the American people where they want to go, someone else will.’  Harold 
Ickes adjudged this address ‘the greatest he has ever made … it will go down in history as 
one of the outstanding speeches delivered by an American statesman.’28 
    A few days later FDR confided to Ickes that he was struggling with how to frame his 
Fireside Chat. In the event, he emulated his second Inaugural Address in contending that 
America now faced a crisis greater than the one in March 1933 – ‘the need to meet the 
unanswered challenge of one-third of a Nation ill-nourished, ill-clad, ill-housed.’  Over the 
past half-century, he warned, the balance of power between the three branches of national 
government had been undermined by the judiciary ‘in direct contradiction of the high 
purposes of the framers of the Constitution.’ Ending on a high note, he refuted charges of 
acting like a dictator: ‘It is my purpose to restore that balance. You who know me will accept 
my solemn assurance that in a world in which democracy is under attack, I seek to make 
American democracy succeed.’29 
Voicing the scepticism of the New York Times, Washington bureau chief Arthur 
Krock anticipated that FDR would appoint ‘party men’ rather than accomplished jurists to the 
Supreme Court.  Public reaction to the fireside address was more favourable but did not elicit 
the same level of support as FDR’s earliest efforts.  The White House received many letters 
from Democratic voters and self-declared independents expressing admiration for the 
president but declaring him wrong on this issue. Others were very critical of the Court 
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proposal as undemocratic and dangerous, with some expressing concern that FDR was 
aiming to become a dictator. Most correspondents put their trust in FDR to do the right thing 
because of the ‘fearless courage’ he had shown in taking on the bankers and corporations. 
‘We workers are with you to the end of this bitter fight,’ wrote one listener, while an African-
American living in Louisiana called Roosevelt ‘a shepherd for your flock’ and suggested he 
nominate a black justice among the new appointments to the Supreme Court. 30 
The Gallup poll findings indicated that FDR’s campaign met with some success. 
Following his Victory Dinner speech and Fireside Chat, respondent approval  for the Court 
plan increased from 41 percent to 46 percent and opposition fell from 50 percent to 44 
percent, with ‘don’t knows’ at 9 to 10 percent. Popular support for the plan remained 
marginally stronger than opposition to it until the Court upheld the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935 in a landmark ruling on 4 April. With the urgency of Court reform appearing to 
decrease, opposition thereafter rose to 46 percent while support fell to 44 percent.  Associate 
Justice Willis Van Devanter’s announcement on 18 May that he would retire at the end of the 
current judicial term then opened the way for FDR to replace one of the ‘Four Horsemen’ 
with a liberal nominee.  Public support for reform consequently dropped to its lowest point at 
31 percent while opposition rose to 45 percent and climbed thereafter to 50 percent.31  Gallup 
polls suggested that public opposition never ran higher than 50 percent and popular approval 
ranged from 31 percent to 46 percent.  Though FDR’s support was far from anaemic, it was 
not sufficiently robust to persuade doubtful members of Congress to vote for the scheme.  
The sudden death on 14 July of Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson of Arkansas, who 
was leading the fight for judicial reform in the upper chamber and had been promised the first 
vacancy on the Supreme Court, proved the final blow for presidential hopes.  On 22 July the 
Senate voted by 70 to 20 to send the Judiciary Bill back to committee without the Supreme 
Court clauses and the resulting Judiciary Act was signed by FDR on 24 August. Explaining 
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this outcome, William Leuchtenburg suggested that the ‘greater the insecurity of the times, 
the more people cling to the few institutions that seem unchangeable.’ In any event, the 
Supreme Court plan was dead, and no American president has thereafter attempted to 
reorganise the judiciary.32  
Winning the war  
FDR would later claim that he had ‘lost the battle but won the war’ over judicial change.  
According to historian James MacGregor Burns, however, the impact of the controversy on 
Congress and the Democratic party meant that the president had ‘lost the battle, won the 
campaign, but lost the war.’ Certainly, FDR had failed to achieve a radical reorganisation of 
the Supreme Court and the issue had widened the divide between liberal and conservative 
Democrats, but the event that helped to deliver the coup de grace to the court-packing plan – 
the resignation of Associate Justice Willis Van Devanter –  also brought judicial 
conservatism closer to its Appomattox. This was the first of five judicial vacancies created by 
retirement or death within a three-year period.  By the end of FDR’s second term, the 
Supreme Court had to all intents and purposes become the Roosevelt Court.  Four further 
nominations in his third term confirmed this reality.  Only George Washington in the early 
years of the Supreme Court had nominated more justices. A decade later five of his nominees 
joined with three of Harry S. Truman’s appointees to render the epochal school-desegregation 
decision, Brown vs. Topeka, under the leadership of liberal Republican Earl Warren, Dwight 
D. Eisenhower’s first judicial nominee.33  
Following the Judiciary bill defeat, FDR went by train on a tour of the Pacific 
Northwest to inspect various New Deal public-works projects. In a rear platform address at 
Boisie, Idaho, the president likened himself to ‘an old mythological character by the name of 
Antaeus,’ whose strength redoubled every time his foot touched the ground. ‘I feel that I 
regain strength by just meeting the American people.’34 The subtext was clear: he may have 
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stumbled with Congress, but the people were still with him.  A reinvigorated Roosevelt used 
another Fireside Chat on 12 October to draw a line under the Supreme Court imbroglio. This 
radio address gave perfect form to Roosevelt’s image as a great campaigner through its 
confident expression in the wellbeing of American democracy.  
‘Five years of fierce discussion and debate,’ the president asserted, ‘five years of 
information through the radio and the moving picture, have taken the whole nation to school 
in the nation's business. Even those who have most attacked our objectives have, by their 
very criticism, encouraged the mass of our citizens to think about and understand the issues 
involved, and understanding, to approve.’  FDR had pointedly not referred to the role of the 
press in his paean to the country’s democratic spirit, but he was confident that hostile 
newspaper owners could not destroy the bond between people and president based on their 
agreement that activist government was necessary to resolve the nation’s problems.  
Americans, he avowed, ‘are less concerned that every detail be immediately right than they 
are that the direction be right. They know that just so long as we are traveling on the right 
road, it does not make much difference if occasionally we hit a “Thank you ma’am”.’35 
Lauding this optimistic address, New York Times radio editor Orrin Dunlap conjured 
up an arresting image of FDR’s peerless skills of political communication through the 
medium by referring to him as ‘a Blondin of the wavelengths,’ whose ‘all-American voice … 
[had] lifted the art of broadcast speaking to lofty heights’. For the political parties  planning  
their 1940 campaign, he continued, ‘part of the problem may be to find a voice as well as a 
man’ because politicians and broadcasters were now of one mind that ‘no matter how strong 
a candidate’s prestige and character, if he has a weak voice personality on the radio, he has 
one if not two strikes on him when he steps up to the “mike.”’ The ‘magnetic technique’ that 
made FDR the master of the medium was not a complicated one: ‘Naturalness is the keynote. 
He talks smoothly and in a conversational tone, seldom faltering on a single word; rarely does 
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he cough or clear his throat during a half-hour “chat.”’ In Dunlap’s estimate, FDR was ‘born 
with a radio personality,’ making it ‘a difficult assignment’ for any other candidate to 
measure up to him.  The question was already being asked: ’Who have the Democrats to offer 
with a voice like Roosevelt’s; who have the Republicans?’36      
Two weeks later, Arthur Krock reflected in the New York Times on FDR’s position 
following the Supreme Court controversy. In his assessment, whatever their divisions over 
court-packing, conservative Democrats, especially in the South, still had a tribal loyalty to the 
party, and liberals remained strongly supportive of the president’s New Deal.  Meanwhile, the 
GOP’s ‘strategy of silence’ during the Court controversy may have appeared to be clever 
politics at the time, but it had won them few new adherents. A realignment of political forces 
would therefore be very difficult to achieve without ‘a great leader with a powerful 
personality and record appealing to the country’ and at present FDR was ‘the only national 
leader on the scene or in sight.’37 
FDR’s image as a strong leader would arguably suffer more damage from the 
outcome of the 1938 midterm elections than it had from the Supreme Court controversy.  His 
largely unsuccessful efforts to purge anti-New Deal Democrats by supporting liberal 
challengers in the primaries raised doubts about his control over his own party.  The so-called 
Roosevelt recession of 1937-38 also did much to precipitate the Republican comeback in the 
midterms.  In the new Congress that met in 1939, the Democrats held majorities in both 
chambers, but an informal coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats had the 
votes to block further significant expansion of the New Deal.  Sensing that FDR was at the 
nadir of his prestige, columnist Raymond Clapper commented ‘[C]learly … President 
Roosevelt could not run for a third term even if he so desired.’38  A half-century before Bill 
Clinton would forge his ‘Comeback Kid’ image, FDR would mount an even greater political 
recovery to win four more years as president.  
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The international situation and the threat of war in Europe had significant impact on 
the environment of American politics.  As Roosevelt biographer Roger Daniels observed, his 
annual message in January 1939 and the congressional response to it prefigured his relations 
with the legislature for the remainder of his presidency: ‘As long as his chief concern was 
national defense and eventually the prosecution of the war, he could usually count on 
majority support drawn from both sides of the aisle for most of his proposals.  But when he 
endeavoured to expand the New Deal, he would often encounter serious difficulties.’ In this 
address, his avowal to build up America’s military strength to keep it safe from attack was 
broadly well received, but his insistence that the nation’s programme of social and economic 
reform was ‘a part of defense as basic as armaments themselves’ drew far less support.39 
The outbreak of war in Europe led to another Fireside Chat on 3 September 
confirming American neutrality but – unlike Woodrow Wilson in August 1914 – not asking 
for neutrality in thought as well as action. However, the president did make ‘the simple plea 
that partisanship and selfishness be adjourned; and that national unity be the thought that 
underlies all others.’40 Clearly Roosevelt was shifting his image from the rather divisive 
reformer of the 1930s to the unifying leader of the wartime era.  Indeed, from this point in 
time, all his Fireside Chats would have a war-related theme. In combination with his formal 
presidential speeches, best exemplified by his 1941 State of the Union address41, they would 
do much to educate Americans about their nation’s democratic purpose in eventually joining 
the conflict. With the dramatic success of the German blitzkrieg in the summer of 1940, FDR 
effectively created an administration of national unity by appointing eminent Republicans 
Frank Knox as Navy Secretary and Henry Stimson as Secretary of War.  Both had been 
trenchant critics of his court-packing plan but were strong supporters of his efforts to move 
American public opinion away from isolationism.   
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The apparent imminence of Adolf Hitler’s total victory in the European conflict also 
formed the backdrop to FDR’s nomination for an unprecedented third-term as president by 
the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. His image as a strong and experienced 
leader was to prove essential in his defeat of his relatively untested Republican challenger, 
Wendell Willkie, in the November presidential election. This was no landslide victory on the 
scale of 1940, but it was still a comfortable one by 54.7 to 44.8 percent of the popular vote 
and by 449 to 82 votes in the Electoral College.  In one way, the outcome confirmed the 
continued importance of the New Deal voter coalition that had formed in support of the 
Democrats in FDR’s first term.  In another way, it was also a triumph for the Rooseveltian 
image.  As Republican House minority leader Joseph Martin of Massachusetts later observed, 
‘There are times, and 1940 was one when the party that seems best able to prosecute a war is 
invincible.  In the last analysis, the people trusted Roosevelt’s experience in coping with the 
situation that confronted the country.’  For that reason, it is reasonable to conclude that no 
other Democratic candidate could have won the presidency in 1940.42  FDR was genuinely 
reluctant to run again but he was determined to uphold both national security and the New 
Deal. During his third term ‘Dr New Deal’ became subordinate to ‘Dr Win-the-War.’ 
However, the spirit of New Deal reformism never entirely disappeared and would find 
expression in his 1944 State of the Union address with its vision of promoting an Economic 
Bill of Rights once the war was won.43  
Conclusion  
If FDR’s image and, indeed, his presidency, were on trial during the Supreme Court episode, 
the outcome of the 1940 presidential election suggests that he was acquitted by the jury that 
matters most in American politics – public opinion. The defeat of his judiciary bill did not 
mean that his powers of persuasion were in decline. The Gallup poll findings suggest that he 
was able to carry a significant proportion of the population with him, and in the month 
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following his Fireside Chat on the Court, a plurality.  But in a political system defined by 
checks and balances there is a limit to the constitutional change that any president can 
achieve without securing a formal amendment to the Constitution – even one as popular as 
Roosevelt. However, FDR’s radio presence remained a potent weapon in exercising the 
‘power to persuade’ as was demonstrated by his leadership during World War 2, when he 
delivered over half of his total of thirty Fireside Chats to far larger audiences than in 
peacetime. In December 1940 his ‘garden hose’ analogy for Lend Lease and the ‘arsenal of 
democracy’ metaphor in his fireside chat showed that FDR retained his rhetorical powers and 
his mastery as ‘the Voice on the Radio’ – a mastery that won the admiration of Winston 
Churchill in beleaguered Britain as well as the President’s supporters at home. The ‘Great 
Campaigner’ had not lost his touch.44  
How then do we explain the resilience of the Roosevelt image? Essentially the image 
of FDR as a charismatic and reforming president had already been established by the start of 
his second term. As the Gridiron skits suggested, the main issue raised during the Supreme 
Court controversy centred upon his judgement in adopting the ‘Court packing’ plan.  While 
some doubted his motives, what concerned many critics were his methods, which would be 
dangerous in the hands of a dictatorial successor. Had he stood down in 1940 FDR would 
probably have been regarded by history as a ‘near great’ President – somewhat akin to 
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Harry S. Truman. From 1940, however, as the 
threat from Nazism grew and was reinforced by Japan after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
Roosevelt the progressive reformer became Roosevelt the defender of democracy. As James 
McGregor Burns put it, ‘the Lion and the Fox’ gave way to the ‘Soldier of Freedom’ and 
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